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In Hindson v. As/dy, [1896] 2 Ch. I, the Court of Appeal
of England has practically reversed the decision of Romer, J.
([1896] i Ch. 78; see 35 AM. L. REG. (N. S.) 88.)
Accretion,
The facts, which were imperfectly set out in the
Rights of
Riparian
former report, were as follows: The plaintiffs were
Owners and
Owners of Bed entitled to a piece of land bounded on one side by
of River
the Thames, this land ending in an almost perpendicular bank from five to six feet high. The bed of the river
reached to the foot of this bank, and the water often reached
some height above the foot. The defendanf owned a separate
fishery in the river, and the bed of the river. Over fifty years
before the action was brought, a row of willows was planted
in the river at a short distance from the bank, which became
large trees, and were always treated as his by the defendant.
An accumulation of silt and mud gradually formed along the
bank, and above and below the plaintiff's land, aided, no
doubt, by the presence of the willows. Some twenty years
after the trees were plarited, as the mud had become tolerably
firm, a small ditch was cut at the foot of the plaintiff's bank
by the defendant or his father, which was thenceforth constantly cleared out by the defendant. The purpose of this
was stated to be to mark the boundary of the plaintiff's land.
In 1877, or thereabout, a weir further down the river was
removed, which caused the water to sink about two feet,
widening the distance between the bank and the water when
the river was low, and facilitating the accumulation of mud at
the foot of the bank. The strip thus formed is dry in summer,
but still covered with water in winter. The defendant, in order
to make a path to a small island claimed by him, filled up the
ditch at the foot of the bank with concrete, and the plaintiffs
brought this action to prevent him from trespassing, claiming
the strip of mud as an accretion. Judge Romer held that it
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was to be so regarded; but the Court of Appeal ruled that it
belonged to the defendant as part of the river-bed, and that the
only right the plaintiffs had was that of free access to the river
by passing over it.
The action on the case given by the Pub. Stat. R. I. c. 204,
§ 22, to recover damages for the larceny of pdrsonal property,

making a person convicted thereof liable to the
owner of the money or property for twice its value,
Penal and
unless it be restored, and then for the value thereof,
Remedial,
Survival
is a remedial, and not a penal statute,
since the
damages are given to the person injured as compensation for
the wrong, not for the punishment of the wrongdoer; and
survives to the representatives of the plaintiff, under Pub. Stat.
R. I. c. 204, § 8, which provides that actions "on the case for
Actions,

damages to .

. .

. personal estate" shall survive on the death

of either party: Aylsworth v. Curtis, (Supreme Court of Rhode
Island,) 34 Atl. Rep. I1o9.
An order on an employer to pay to a creditor of the
employe money not yet due under the contract of employAssignment, ment operates as an equitable assignment of the
fund as soon as it is earned, though the drawee
Equitable
did not accept the order : Merchants' & Miners' Natl. Bank v.
Barnes, (Supreme Court of Montana,) 45 Pac. Rep. 218; but
an assignment of unearned salary of a public official is against
public policy, and void: Stevenson v. Kyle, (Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia,) 24 . E. Rep. 886, even in the
hands of an assignee; for he must be held to know that it is
illegal: Bangs v. Dunn, 66 Cal. 72.
In a recent case in the Queen's Bench Division of England,
before Justice Vaughan Williams, a surety had guaranteed a
Bankruptcy, bank the payment of all sums of money which
Proof of Debt then were or might thereafter from time to time
Guaranteed,
become due or owing to the bank from S., who
Payment
was its customer, but the total amount recoverable
by Surety
from the surety was not to exceed -3oo.

The guaranty was
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to be a continuing security, and any dividend which the bank
might receive in case of the bankruptcy of S. were not to prejudice their right to recover from the surety to the full extent of
the guaranty any sums which might still remain owing to them
by S. after the receipt of such dividend. S. became bankrupt,
and the bank, after receiving the £300 from the surety, claimed
to prove for the full amount due to them from S. The trustee
in bankruptcy contended that the proof ought to be reduced
by the amount the bank had received from the surety. Thebank appealed, and the court ruled that it had a right to prove
for the whole debt, without any deduction, unless the sum paid
by the surety was twenty shillings in the pound: fn re Sass,
[1896] 2 Q. B. 12.
According to a late decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, a contractor is not responsible for a.
Building
Contract,
delay caused by a change in the plans of aConditions,
building, made at the oral request of the owner,.
Performance.
Alteration of
Plans

though the building contract requires that a
written order shall be given for any change which

affects the cost of the building, or the time of its completion:
Focht v. Rosenbaum, 34 Atl. Rep. Ioo.
In another case before the court last named, Burnett v..
Penna. R. R. CO., 34 Atl. Rep. 972, the defendant company,.
Carriers, a Pennsylvania corporation, issued and delivered
Limiting
to the plaintiff, in the State of New Jersey, a pass
Liability,
Conflict of
from Philadelphia to Elmira, N. Y., which proLaws
vided that the plaintiff assumed all risks of accident.
Such a limitation of liability is valid under the laws of New
Jersey, but not under those of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff
was injured, within the State of Pennsylvania, by the admitted
negligence of defendant's employes. The limitation in the
pass was alleged to defeat recovery, but the court held that
since the contract of carriage was to be performed in Pennsyl-vania, it was governed by the laws of that State, and not by
the laws of the place where it was made.
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One who, without the knowledge of the conductor, rides
upun the rear bumper of a street-car, which is full to overStreet-Cars, flowing, is guilty of contributory negligence as a
Contributory matter of law, and cannot recover for injuries
Negligence
caused by another car coming up from behind and
striking the car on which he is standing: Bard v. Penna.
Traction Co., (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,) 34 At. Rep. 953.
In Lower v. Segal, 34 At. Rep. 945, Judge Garrison, of
the Supreme Court of New Jersey has lately held, that though
the courts of New Jersey will enforce the PennsylConfltct of
Lws,
vania Statute giving a right of action to the widow
Death by
Wrongful Act,
Action by
Wrong
Plaintiff

of one who dies of injuries inflicted by the wrongful
act of another, since that statute is not repugnant
to the policy of the former State, yet such an action

cannot be brought in New Jersey by the personal
representative of the deceased, as required by the laws of that
state in similar cases, and a declaration in a suit by the personal
representative, based on the Pennsylvania Statute, is bad on
demurrer.
A by-law of a stock corporation, which provides that if any
stockholder shall desire to dispose of his stock he shall give
Corporation, written notice to the president of his intention to
By-law,
sell, which notice the president shall communicate
Validity
to the other stockholders, that the stockholders
shall then have the option to purchase the stock at the price
named, and that the corporation shall have the option to purchase it if the stockholders do not exercise their option, is an
invalid restraint on the power of alienation, and void: Victor
G. Bloede Co. of Baltimore City v. Bloede, (Court of Appeals of
Maryland,) 34 At. Rep. 1127.
In a prosecution under 3 How. Am. Stat., Mich., c. 51, § I,
for being a disorderly person, in that he "pretended to tell
fortunes," advertisements inserted by him in the
Criminal Law,
newspapers, in which he professed his ability to
Fortunetelling,
foretell future events, and offered his services to
Evidence

the public for that purpose, were admissible to
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establish the offence charged: Peo. v. Elmer, (Supreme Court
of Michigan,) 67 N. W. Rep. 550.
To the same effect is Penny v. Hanson, 16 Cox, C. C. 173.
In State v. Nelson, 34 Atl. Rep. 99 o , the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island, laying down the broad doctrine that all the
constitutional provisions in regard to former
jeopardy are intended to secure the same a right
Jeopardy,
Discharge of
y

to absolute immunity from a charge after an

acquittal, and the right to have a trial go on

after it has begun, ruled that under the Constitution of that
State, (Art. 1, § 7,) which provides that " no person shall,
after an acquittal, be tried for the same offence," a plea filed"
by a defendant, setting out that on a former trial for the same
offence the jury were discharged by the court against the
defendant's objection, upon a report of the illness of a juror,
made to an officer of the court by telephone, states a sufficient
ground for the discharge of the defendant; for such a discharge of the jury, based on a mere report, is not within any
of the well-recognized exceptions to the general rule, and is.
not a valid exercise of judicial discretion.
The Supreme Court of Florida, following'the invariable rule
that no legal sentence can be pronounced in a felony case
upon a verdict rendered and received by the courtVerdict,
during the absence of the defendant, has lately
Absence of
held that when the defendant in such a case
Defendant
voluntarily absconds while the jury are out considering their
verdict, the proper practice is for the judge to declare a mistrial and discharge the jury, without receiving any verdict,
after he becomes satisfied that the defendant cannot be produced within a reasonable time; and that if, after the defend-ant in a felony case has absconded, a verdict of guilty is.
received and the jury discharged during his absence, and
sentence pronounced thereon by the court at a subsequent
term, the verdict and sentence are mere nullities: Summeralls,
v. State, 2o So. Rep. 242.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has recently decided,,
following State v. Allen, 43 Neb. 6 5 1, (1895), that the ques-.
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Elections,
Nominations,

tions as to which of two factions in a political

party is the true representative of that party is a
Conventions, political, rather than a judicial question, which the
Duties of Sec- Secretary of State, in certifying nominations, has
retary of State no power to decide; and
therefore, when two
factions of a political party nominate candidates and certify
their nominations to the Secretary of State in due form, the
latter should not inquire into the regularity of the convention
held by either faction, but should certify to the county officers
the names of the candidates nominated by each : Phelps v. Pipcr.
67 N. W. Rep. 755.
To the same effect are Peo v. District Court, 18 Colo. 26,
1892, and Shields v. Jacobs, 88 Mich. 164, 1891. See 34 AAi.
L. REG. (N. S.) 219.
In In re East York Election, 32 Con. L. J. 481, Mc Dougall, Co. J., held, that all ballots on which the elector has
made a cross in the division containing the name
Baiiots,
of the candidates he votes for are valid, though
Marking
the cross is not placed in the space (a circular disk) provided
for it at the right of the name; and also that ballots marked by
a cross-mark with lines drawn over and under it, by a crossmark in ink instead of pencil, by a cross in the shape of a figure
2, with the lines intersecting at the bottom, and bya propercrossmark and also an erazure of the addition under the name of
the other candidate, were good. He disallowed two where the
cross was made on the back of the ballot opposite to the circle.
The language in which the learned judge disposes of the
contention that the statutory requirement as to position of the
cross is mandatory, is worth quoting. " Lord Mansfield's rule
as to whether a statute is mandatory or not, as stated in
Potter's Dwarrison on Statutes, (p. 224,) depends upon whether
the thing directed to be done is 8f the essence of the thing
required. Now here the essence of the thing required is the
marking of the ballot secretly with a cross so as to indicate
with clearness which candidate the elector votes for. The
position of the cross as indicating the elector's choice of a candidate is to my mind not of the essence of the thing required
to be done."

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

Under the Canada Election Act of 1874, which required
the cross to be placed at the right of the candidate's name, the
Ontario court pronounced two opposite judgments, one
holding that a cross at the left would be good, as the statute
was only directory: North ictoria Case, Hodgins' El. Cas.,
-68o; the other that the statute was mandatory, and that a
-cross placed any where but at the right of the name, would
vitiate the ballot: Monk's Case, Hodgins El. Cas., 73 o . The
American Cases on this subject will be found in 33 Am. L.
REG. (N. S.) 748; 34 Am.L. REG. (N. S.) 85, 155, 222 359,
430, 491, 556, 638, 719, 780.
In Danville Street Car Co. v. Payne, 24 S.E. Rep. 904, the
.Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has lately held, that a
fall of snow in January cannot be considered as an
Electric
"Act of God" which will relieve the defendant
Railways,
Snow on
from liability for injuries occasioned thereby; that
Track,
vis Major, when there's such a fall of snow, the employes of
Control of

an electric street railway are bound to know the
Car
-difficulty of managing the car, and must approach grades at a
rate of speed which will allow them to keep the car under
control; and that if, when there's snow on the track, they
.approach a heavy grade at such speed that the car slides down
it in spite of the brakes, which work properly, the company
-will be liable for injuries caused to a passenger thereby.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, in Subur.ban Electric Co. v. Nugent, 34 Atl. Rep. lO69, has decided
some very interesting questions in reference to
Electric
accidents from electric wires. The plaintiff's intesWires,
Negligence,
Contributory tate was found dead about three feet from the base
of an electric light pole. There was no direct
Negligence
evidence of the cause of death. On this pole was fastened a
reel, at about the level of a man's head, around which was
wound a wire rope used to raise and lower the lamp on the
pole, and this wire was practically uninsulated and heavily
charged with electricity. A post-mortem examination showed
.all of deceased's organs to have been in a normal condition, and
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that his death was not caused by disease of any kind; but on
his left hand, running all the way across it, was a freshly made
burn, about one-sixth of an inch in width; and his blood was
in an abnormal state, such as is found in persons who have
died from electric shock. Upon these facts the court held
that it was only reasonable to suppose that the decedent came
to his death through touching the uninsulated wire on the
reel; that in so maintaining this wire, within reach of passersby, the defendant company was guilty of negligence; and that
as there was nothing to show how the plaintiff's intestate
received the shock that killed him, there was nothing upon
which his negligence could be predicated.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has recently
had before it a very peculiar case. A city built a sewer in a
public street, the soil of which opposite the plaintEminent
iff's premises consisted of about three feet of
Domain,
Construction

of Sewer,
Injury to
Land,
Loss of Lateral
Support

gravel filling, upon about ten feet of peat and silt,

below which was very fine sand and silt on quick-

sand. The soil of the plaintiff's premises was of
the same nature, and part of the same strata.

The underlying sand contained a great deal of water, and
while the sewer trench, which was twenty-six feet deep, was
being dug, it was kept free from water by buckets and pumps.
A great deal of the substratum of water-logged sand ran into
the trench, from the plaintiff's premises, and the surface, being
deprived of its subjacent and lateral support, cracked and
settled, and his buildings were injured. Upon these facts it
was held that the city was liable to him for damages: Cabot v.
-Kingman,4 4 N. E. Rep. 344.
Justices Holmes, Knowlton and Lathrop dissented, on the
authority of Popplewell v. Hodkinson, 4 L. R. Exch. 248,
1869, where it was decided that the owner of land, had no
right to the support of subterranean waters, and could not
recover damages from one who, by draining his own land,
withdrew such support from another, and caused his land to
subside, and on the ground that a quicksand which flowed so
freely as to be raised by a pump ought to follow that analogy.
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According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
New York, Appellate Division, First Department, a stipulation
in a policy on which one hundred underwriters are
Insurance,
severally liable for the one-hundredth part of the
Several
Underwriters,
insurance, that the assured shall not sue more
Stipulation
for Separate than one of the underwriters at one time, and
that a final decision in any action thus brought
Suits
shall be decisive of the claim of the assured. against each of
the underwriters who agree to abide the event of the suit, is
not void as against public policy, but valid on the ground that
it tends to prevent a multiplicity of suits; and in an action
to which all of the underwriters are made parties defendant,
a plea that it was brought in violation of the agreement should
be sustained: New jersey and Penna. Concentrating Works v.
Ackerman, 39 N. Y. Suppl. 585.
One who carelessly slips on a railroad track, without
noticing an approaching train, is not guilty of voluntary
an acciexposure to danger within the clause of
Accident
insur"this
that
providing
policy
dent insurance
insurance,
Construction ance does not cover . . . voluntary exposure to
of Policy
unnecessary danger:" Lehmau v. Great
Eastern
Casualty and Indemnity Co. of N. Y., (Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department,) 39 N. Y.
Suppl. 912.
One who has no title, legal or equitable, in property, and no
present possession or right of possession therein, has nevertheInsurance' less an insurable interest in the property, if he will
derive a benefit from its continued existence, or
rire,
Insurable
suffer Joss by its destruction; and therefore a
Interest,
mortgagor of real estate, who conveys the title of
Mortgagor
who has conveyed his
Equity

the property mortgaged to another, subject to the
mortgage, has an insurable interest in that real

estate, since he remains liable to the mortgagee for any
deficiency: Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Bohn, (Supreme Court
of Nebraska.) 67 N. W. Rep. 774.
Vice-Chancellor Pitney, of the Court of Chancery of New
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Jersey, has lately decided, that if mortgagees of a
and Tenant, stock of goods in a leased store building take
When Rela- possession of the goods therein, by permission
tion Arises,
Possession by of the mortgagors, and use the building to disMortgages of play and sell the goods, and keep the usual
Landlord

Goods

accounts of a retail store, they take possession of
and occupy the building as tenants of its owner, and not as
licensees of the mortgagors: Hatcli v. Van Dervoort, 34 Atl.
Rep. 938.
It is libelous to use the word "slippery" in reference to a
person; e. g., by addressing him in a telegram as "Slippery
Sam." "This word, when used as descriptive of
Libel,
a person, has a well-understood meaning. It
"slippery"
means, when so used, that the person to whom it is applied
cannot be depended on or trusted; that he is dishonest, and
apt to play one false. If such is the meaning of this word as
used in this message-and of this the jury were the judgesit was clearly libelous, because, if a man is dishonest, and apt
to play'one false, he merits the scorn and contempt of all
honorable men. To falsely publish of a man that he is slippery, tends to render him odious and contemptible. Such a
publication is a libel:" Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
(Supreme Court of Minnesota,) 67 N. W. Rep. 646.
It is libelous to publish of one that he is "a dangerous,
able, and seditious agitator:" Wilkes v. Shields, (Minn.,) 64
N. W. Rep. 921 (1895).
The Supreme Court of New York has made another effort
to escape from the bondage of Harfeld v. Roper, 21 Wend.
615, 1839, that absurd case in which it was held
Negligence,
that the parent is to be regarded as the agent of
imputed,
Parent and
a child non suijuris,so as to prevent its recovery
Child
for injuries due to his contributory negligence. Now, though
still recognizing that rule, it holds that the negligence of the
father will not be imputed to an infant about twenty-one
months old, which is injured while in its mother's arms in a
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carriage driven by the father, since in such a case the child is
in the immediate custody of the mother, and not of the father:
Hennessy v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., (Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Division, Second Department,) 39 N. Y.
Suppl. 805.
The court was simply forced to this decision by the circumstances. The mother who was injured at the same time as
the infant, recovered for that injury on the ground that her
husband's negligence could not be imputed to her; Hennessy
v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 73 Hun., (N. Y.) 569, 1894,
affirmed, 147 N. Y. 721, 1895; and it would have been the
grossest injustice to refuse the like privilege to the infant.
But the expedient resorted to was unworthy of the court, and
constitutes no valid reason for its decision, if its premises are
true. if the doctrine of Harifieldv. Roper is correct, then the
father in this case was the agent of the child, although he did
not have manual possession of it. He had the charge of the
team, and all those who were in it; and his negligence in
driving the team, which contributed to the injury, was to be
imputed to the child, as much as if he held it in his arms. It
would have been much more in accordance with legal principles and sound common-sense to have repudiated Hartfeld
v. Roper, and decided the case on the broad ground that the
negligence of a parent cannot be imputed to a child, because
it has no control over him. It would have been the easier to
do this, because the authority, Hartfeld v. Roper, is rejected
in every other State, and has been refuted with unnecessary
particularity again and again, and is only adhered to in the
state of its origin on account of its venerable antiquity.
When two mechanics are riding in a wagon in which they
are transporting their tools, the one who is driving is to be
regarded as the agent of the latter, so as to prevent
Common
him from recovering for injuries received through
Enterprise
the contributory negligence of the driver: Omaha & R. V.
Ry. Co. v. Talbot, (Supreme Court of Nebraska,) 67 N. W.
Rep. 599.
This depends upon the principle that they are to be regarded
as engaged in a common enterprise.
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A very practical application of the rule that one who suffers
special damage from a public nuisance may maintain a private
Nuisance,
Public,

Special

Damages,

Right of
Action

action

therefor has been lately made

by the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff
had contracted to haul a large quantity of dirt
from one place to another at a specified price per
load.

The defendant company, in the
progress

of certain changes it was making in its roadbed, fenced off a
highway which was the direct and natural route from the
place where the dirt was loaded to the place where it was
delivered, and the plaintiff, in consequence, was compelled to
haul the dirt by a circuitous route, which enabled him to haul
but one load in the time in which he might have hauled three
loads by the obstructed route, thus very largely increasing the
cost of the hauling to him. This was held to be sufficient
special damage to entitle him to recover: Knowles v. Penna.
R. R. Co., 34 Atl. Rep. 974.
Following the general rules, when a subordinate officer
takes the place of his superior, on the death or disability of
the latter, he stands in the latter's shoes to all
Officers,
Lieutenant- intents and purposes, and is entitled to the same
Aovernor,
salary, the Supreme Court of Nevada has held,
Acting asSurmhed
Governor,
Salary

that under the constitutional provision that, on
the death of the governor, the powers and duties

of the office shall devolve on the lieutenant-governor, the
latter, in case the duties of the governor's office thus devolve
upon him, is entitled to receive the salary attached to the
governor's office: State v. La Grave, 45 Pac. Rep. 243.
A railroad company is not entitled to the use of an invention patented by its master mechanic, when none of the cornpany's material or labor entered into the discovery
Patents,
Taken Out by or perfection of the invention, and nothing belongEmployes,
Rights of

Employer

ing to the company was devoted to the construction of the appliances until after the invention had

been put into definite form, and the patent issued: Ft. Wayne,
C. & L. R. R. Co. v. Haberkorn, (Appellate Court of Indiana,)
33 N. E. Rep. 322.
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It has been recently held by the Supreme Court of Michigan, that the authority of the superintendent and general
manager of an electric light corporation, who is
Principal
also a director, to bind the corporation by employand Agent,
Powers
ing a nurse for a person injured in its service, is a
of Agent
question for the jury : Hodges
v. Detroit El. Light
& Power Co., 67 N. W. Rep. 564. The superintendent or
general manager of a railroad company has the authority to
employ a physician to attend an injured passenger or employe:
Walker v. Great Western Ry. Co., 2 L. R. Exch. 228, 1867;
Cincinnati,Indianapolis,St. L. & C. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 126 Ind.
99, t89o; Atchison & Neb. R. R. Co. v. Reecher, 24 Kans.
228, 188o; Marquette & Ontarigan R. R. Co. v. Taft, 28
Mich. 289, 1873;
The same rule holds good as to the employment of a physician by any superior officer of a railroad company, in case
there is no higher on the ground; e. g., by a division superintendent : Union Pac.Ry. Co. v. Winterbotham, 52 Kans. 433 ;
by a master mechanic: Pac.R. R. Co. v. Thomas, 19 Kans.
256, 1877; or by a conductor: Terre Haute & Indianapolis
R. R. Co. v. McMurray, 98 Ind. .358, 1884; Terre Haute &
Indianapolis R. R. Co. v. Brown, 107 Ind. 336, 1886; Terre
Haute & Indianapolis R. R. Co. v. Stockwell, i18 Ind. 98,
1888 ; Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Smitl, 121
Ind. 353, 1889; Evansville & Richmond R. R. Co. v. Freeland,
4 Ind. App. 287; Contra, Peninsular R. R. Co. v. Gary, 22
Fla. 356, 1886; but not when he is employed by a roadmaster: PeninsularR. R. Co. v. Gary, 22 Fla. 356, 1886;
Louisville, Evansville & St. L. Ry. Co. v. McVay, 98 Ind. 391,
1884; a yard master: M1Tarquette & OntariganR. R. Co. v.
Taft, 28 Mich. 289; or a station agent: Cox v. M'idland
Counties Ry. Co., 3 Exch. 268, 1849; though in any case the
employment will be binding, if ratified by the superintendent:
Louisville, Evansville & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Ac Vay, 98 Ind. 391,
1884; Pacific R. R. Co. v. Thomas, 19 Kans. 256, 1877;
The general manager of a trading or manufacturing corporation, however, has no such inherent power; but whether or
not he possesses delegated authority for that purpose is a
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question for the jury: Swazey v. Union Mfg. Co. 42 Conn.
556, 1875 ; Chaften v. Freeland,7 Ind. App. 676; lklisenbach
v. Southern Cooperage Co., 45 Mo. App. 232.
When a purchaser of real estate, holding a bond for title,
transfers it to a third person, and thus becomes a_
surety for the payment of notes given for purchaseRelease of
money, he will not be released from liability
Surety,
Extension of thereon by a new contract between the vendor
Time
and the transferee extending
the time of payment,
if that contract expressly provides that it shall not affect the
original notes, nor operate to extend them, except at the
election of the maker: Hodges v. Elytar Land Co., (Supreme
Court of Alabama,) 2o So. Rep. 23.
Principal

and Surety,

In Norfolk & W. R. R. Co. v. Commonwealtl,
Railroads,
Prohibition of
Running

S. E. Rep.
837, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
reached independently the same conclusion as the
24

FreightTrains Supreme Court of the United States in Henningon Sunday, ton v. Georgia, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. lO86, (see 35
Interstate
Commerce

AMi. L. REG. (N. S.) 390,) that a statute forbidding
the running of freight trains on Sunday does not conflict with
the interstate commerce clauses of the federal constitution,
though it may operate to prevent through freight trains from
passing through that State from one State to another. This
overrules Norfolk & W. R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 95.
In Consolidated Traction Co. v. Scott, 34 Atl. Rep. 1094, the
Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey has very justly
decided, that when a street car, propelled by elecStreet
tricity, is stopping at a crossing to receive and disRailroads,
Crossings,
charge passengers, it is not the duty of one who
Negligence,
Stop and Look wishes
Ruie
ing on

to cross the street to look for cars approachthe other track, the rule as to steam rail-

roads not applying to a street car track in a city street, where
the rights of the company and of the public are equal; and
that therefore when a boy, nearly eight years old, walked
across a street behind a standing car, without looking for cars
on the other track, and was struck and killed by a car
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approaching without warning on the other track in the opposite direction, his view of it being obstructed by the standing
car, the questions of negligence and contributory negligence
were for the jury.
This rule coincides with that adopted in Driscoll v. Market
St. Cable Ry. Co., 97 Cal. 553, 1893, but is in direct opposition to that laid down in Scott v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 16 N.
Y. Suppl. 350, 1891, reversing 13 N. Y. Suppl. 344, 189o. It
is well settled, however, that one who crosses a street behind
a moving car at a place not a regular crossing is guilty of contributory negligence if he does not look out for cars on the
other track: Baker v. Eighth Ave. R. R. Co., 62 Hun, (N. Y.)
39, 189i; Reich v. Union Ry. Co., 78 Hun, (N. Y.) 417,
1894; Thompson v. Buffalo Ry. Co. 145 N. Y. 196, 1895.
When the person who attempts to cross behind a standing
car has just alighted from it, one would naturally suppose that
the rule in regard to steam railroads would be applied, i. e.,
that an alighting passenger or an intending passenger going
to take a train, has a right to presume that the track will be
kept clear in order to enable him to reach the station or the
train: B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. State, 6o Md. 4 4 9 , 1883 ; Gaynor
v. Old Colony & Newport Ry Co., Ioo Mass. 208, 1868;
Klein v.Jewelt, 26 N. J. Eq. 474, 1875; Armstrong v. N. Y
Cent. & H. R. R. R. Co., 64 N. Y. 635, 1876, affirming 66
Barb. (N. Y.) 437; Brassell v. N. Y Cent. & H. R. R. R. Co.,
84 N. Y. 241, 1881 ; Terry v. Jewett, 17 Hun, (N. Y.) 395,
1879.
In Illinois and Ohio it has accordingly been held that such
a passenger is not guilty of contributory negligence in failing
to look before crossing the other track: Chicago City Ry. Co.
v. Robinson, 127 Ill. i, 1888; Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. v. Snell,
(Ohio) 43 N. E' Rep. 207, 1896; the New York cases are
inconsistent, Dobert v. Troy City Ry. Co., 36 N. Y. Suppl. 105,
1895, following the Illinois rule, and Doyle v. Albany Ry. Co.,
39 N. Y. Suppl. 440, 1896, adopting the Pennsylvania doctrine mentioned below; and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Buzby v. Phila. Traction Co., 126 Pa. 559, 1889, while
acknowledging that the stop, look and listen rule did not apply,
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holds, that such a case must be tested "upon the universal
rule which requires due and ordinary care in crossing public
streets, as in all the other transactions of life."
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in a recent case before it,
admitted the existence of the general rule in the case of a
passenger alighting from a street car at the usual stoppingplace, but held that when he alighted on the other side of the
street, before it stopped, and while he had plenty of time to
cross in safety, (the car that struck him being then two hundred feet away,) it must be presumed that he was guilty of'
contributory negligence: Evansville St. R. R. Co. v. Gentry,
44 N. E. Rep. 31.
Remarks of the trial judge to the jury, to the effect that
unless they agree he will keep them to the end of'
Trial,
Remarks of the term, as the county cannot afford to try the
Judge on
FailureofJury case over again, are ground for reversal Nort,11
_
to Agree
Dallas Circuit Ry. Co. v. McCue, (Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas,) 35 S. W. Rep. io80.
It has been recently held, that Art. 2, § 22, of the constitution of Kansas, exempting members of the legislature from the.
service of civil process "during the session," must
Writs,
Service,
be construed to mean any session of either branch
Exemption, of the legislature which the provisions of the constitution require to be held, and applies to a session of the
senate held for the purpose of trying an impeachment: Cookv.
Senior, (Court of Appeals of Kansas, Southern Dept., E. D.,)
45 Pac. Rep. 126.

